Submissions

Submissions of an extended abstract (not exceeding 2 pages) are to be made on-line through this webpage. Both TeX or MS Word (recommended) files are possible.

 

To submit a paper to GTM2016 you need to register as a user to the EasyChar System.

 

The decision concerning the acceptance of a presentation will be made on the basis of the extended abstract submission. A volume of GTM 2016 extended abstracts will be available for registered participants at the beginning of the conference.


After the conference, all participants will have an opportunity to submit their papers for publication in a refereed "Contributions to Game Theory and Management", vol. X.

 

Deadlines

 

  • Extended abstracts and invited session submission: February 20th, 2016
  • Notification of acceptance: March 20th, 2016
  • Final version of the extended abstract: April 20th, 2016

 

 

List of accepted papers

 

#

Authors

Title

1

Andrey Zyatchin

Open vehicle routing game

2

Saeed Seyed Agha Banihashemi

Co-existence of game theory and management

3

Guennady Ougolnitsky and Anatoly Usov

Comparative analysis of efficiency of the methods of sustainable management in hierarchical differential games

4

Hongwei Gao, Han Qiao, Shou-Yang Wang and Meng-Ke Zhen

The algorithm and model of pairwise stable networks

5

Valery Vasilev

On some fuzzy extensions of TU cooperative game

6

Jian-Jun Shu

Wisdom in Tian Ji’s Horse Racing Strategy

7

Roberto Serrano, Geoffroy De Clippel and Rene Saran

Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reason and Small Modeling Mistakes

8

Wenna Wang, Hao Sun and Genjiu Xu

Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the α-egalitarian Shapley value

9

Jun Su, Genjiu Xu and Cuiying Zhu

Bankruptcy approach to the cost allocation problems

10

Ryusuke Hohzaki

A Search Game with Incomplete Information on Detective Capability of Searcher

11

Victor Rozen

Situations of tr-equilibrium in antagonistic games with ordered outcomes

12

Ibrahim Inal

Purification without Common Knowledge of Priors

13

Maryam Esmaeili

A signaling advertising model between an intelligent consumer and two e-tailers

14

Alexander Tarasyev

Decomposition Algorithms for Construction of Control Strategies in Dynamical Games

15

Michele Dell'Era

Talking to Influence

16

Vladimir Ushakov, Alexander Matviychuk and Andrey Ushakov

Solution of Control Problems of Nonlinear Systems on a Finite Time Interval

17

Alexander Nesterov

School Choice With Advice: The Adaptive Acceptance Rule

18

Jaeok Park

Repeated Games with Recursive Utility

19

Yunus Topbas and Unal Zenginobuz

Horizontal Coordination and Transparency of Information

20

Marina Sandomirskaia

Nash-2 equilibrium: definition, interpretation, applications

21

Jorge Gonzalez, David Ríos Insua and Javier Cano

Adversarial Risk Analysis for Bi-agent Influence Diagrams

22

Pavel Konyukhonskiy and Victoria Holodkova

Game theory methods in the analysis of economic and political interaction at the international level

23

Igor Bykadorov, Andrea Ellero, Stefania Funari, Sergey Kokovin and Pavel Molchanov

Painful Birth of Trade under Classical Krugman’s Monopolistic Competition

24

Natalia Aizenberg and Elena Stashkevich

Effective pricing scheme on the retail electricity market for the different types of consumers

25

Gustavo Bergantiños, Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga

Consistency in PERT problems

26

Jose Fernandez, Said Salhi and Boglárka G.-Tóth

A location-price game for locating a competitive facility in the plane

27

Anna Panova and Petr Panov

On the costly voting model

28

Alexander Tarasyev and Nikolay Krasovskii

Dynamical Equilibria in Bimatrix Coordination Games

29

Dmitrii Lozovanu and Stefan Pickl

An Approach for Determining the Optimal Strategies in Average Antagonistic Stochastic Games

30

Pierre Von Mouche

On the New Approach of Coalition Formation

31

Aleksei Kondratev

Tournament as a cooperative game

32

Ekaterina Gromova and Anna Tur

On a Differential Game of Pollution Control with Random Terminal Instants

33

Igor Asanov

Do We Learn From Mistakes of Others? A Test of Observational Learning in the Bandit Problem

34

Martha Saboya Baquero and Susana López González

An alternative allocation rule for players in a communication network

35

Maria Nastych

Strong Nash equilibrium in oligopoly market with horizontal integration

36

Stewart John Blakeway, Ekaterina Gromova, Dmitry Gromov, Anna Kirpichnikova and Nikolay Timonin

A dynamic game on a mobile ad-hoc network

37

Elena Lezhnina

Approach for comparing the values of cooperative games

38

Joosung Lee

Spontaneous Referrals and Explicit Rewards

39

Jing Fu

Information pooling game in an interactive multi-portfolio optimization framework

40

Dmitrii Serkov

On joint fixed points in chain-complete posets

41

Anastasiia Reusova

Strategic Alliance Stability Factors

42

Semyon Mestnikov and Nikolay Petrov

The Sufficient Conditions k*-detection in the Simple Search Game on the Plane

43

Aleksey Ogulenko and Olga Kichmarenko

Dynamical games on time scales

44

Alexey Soloviev

Minimax estimation of Value-at-Risk under hedging of American contingent claims on a discrete financial market

45

Yulia Ibragimova and Fedor Sandomirskiy

Competitive Market Mechanisms for Fair Division of Indivisible Goods

46

Clara Ponsati and Jan Zapal

Electing the Pope: appointments by repeated ballots

47

Anna Khmelnitskaya, Gerard van der Laan and Dolf Talman

Generalization of binomial coefficients to numbers on the nodes of graphs

48

Gerardo Berbeglia, Peter Sloan and Adrian Vetta

The effect of a finite time horizon in the durable good monopoly problem

49

Pascual Fernández, Blas Pelegrín and María Dolores García

A first study on Discrete Competitive Facility Location with capacities under delivered pricing

50

Boris Yanauer, Ekaterina Syrunina and Nikolay Zenkevich

CEO Incentive Plans Improvement in the U.S. Public Companies on the Base of Game Theoretical Modeling

51

N. Chrysanthopoulos and G. P. Papavassilopoulos

A step closer to competition: A different concept of Cournot duopoly under incomplete information

52

Aleksandr Chentsov and Dmitrii Serkov

The elements of the operator convexity in the construction of the programmed iteration method

53

Mark Koryagin, Eugene Duginov and Alexandra Dekina

Optimization of an urban transport system on the condition of different goals of city’s districts

54

Anatolii Kleimenov

Aggressive behavior in non-antagonistic positional differential two-person games

55

Elena Gubar, Ekaterina Zhitkova and Suriya Kumacheva

Optimal behavior in the evolutionary model of spreading information about tax audits

56

Elena Yanovskaya

A characterization of the Nash Maximum Product (NMP) solution for Faired Division problems

57

Yurii Averboukh

Value multifunction for deterministic mean field game

58

Nikolay Zenkevich and Anastasiia Pleshkova

Knowledge-sharing reward efficiency: game theory-based case study

59

Denis Kuzyutin, Maria Nikitina and Irina Marchenko

Time-consistent cooperative solutions in multistage games with vector payoffs

60

Anastasiia Ivakina and Ekaterina Zenkevich

Supply chain cooperation modeling: trends and gaps

61

Svetlana Tarashnina and Nadezhda V. Smirnova

Some excess-based solutions in the game "The landowner and his serfs"

62

Yaroslavna B. Pankratova and Svetlana Tarashnina

On a dynamic traveling salesman problem

63

Denisv. Kuzyutin, Maria V. Nikitina and Andrey Sinkevich

On the vertical differentiation model in the insurance market

64

Nikolay Bazenkov and Vsevolod Korepanov

Farsighted network formation with locally-informed players

65

Ovanes Petrosian

Random Informational Horizon in Looking Forward Approach for Cooperative Differential Games

66

Vladimir Matveenko, Alexei Korolev and Anastasia Alfimova

On dynamic stability of equilibrium in network game with production and externalities

67

Misha Gavrilovich and Victoria Kreps

From a game with incomplete information to a game with complete information

68

Alisa Maricheva and Fedor Sandomirskiy

On envy-free allocations in large fair division problems with indivisible goods.

69

Maksim Shlegel

Coopetition game with a coordinator

70

Elena Inarra

Parametric rules and stable coalition structures

71

Max van Dijk

Cross-Border Collaboration in European-Russian Supply Chains: Integrative Approach of Provision on Design, Performance and Impediments

72

Konstantinos Eleftheriou and Nickolas Michelacakis

Social optimality of locations of heterogeneous firms in a unified model of spatial price discrimination.

73

Natalia Naumova

Reactive and semi--reactive bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation

74

Anna Melnik

The Comparison of two Transportation Games

75

Gabriel Turbay

Auction Equilibrium in Coalition Formation

76

Ekaterina Zaytseva and Margarita Gladkova

Cooperation and coordination in movie value chain

77

Vladimir Mazalov

Game-theoretic centrality measures for analysis of academic web space

78

Anastasiia Koroleva

Stability assessment of Volkswagen's Chinese joint ventures

79

Igor Shevchenko and Dusan M. Stipanovic

Smooth approximations for minimum and maximum functions and their use in the strategy design

80

Irit Nowik and Tahl Nowik

Blotto Games with Costly Winnings

81

Julia Chirkova

Optimal Arrivals to a Two-server Loss System with Random Access

82

Natalia Nikitina

The Price of Anarchy in a Game for Drug Discovery

83

Vasilij Gusev

The vectors of Shapley, Owen, and Aumann-Dreze in the Game Patrolling with Coalitional Structure

84

Stefanos Leonardos and Costis Melolidakis

Cournot competition with an external supplier under capacity constraints and demand uncertainty

85

Anna N. Rettieva

Discrete-time Dynamic Potential Games

86

Pavel Chebotarev, Vitaly Malyshev, Yana Tsodikova, Anton Loginov, Zoya Lezina and Vadim Afonkin

On the Optimal Voting Quota in a Stochastic Environment

87

Elena Parilina and Artem Sedakov

Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player

88

Yulia Lonyagina and Nikolay Zenkevich

Nash Equilibrium and Bargaining Solution in Multi-Echelon Distributive Supply Chains with Linear Demand

Top
Пн
Вт
Ср
Чт
Пт
Сб
Вс