Submissions of an extended abstract (not exceeding 2 pages) are to be made on-line through this webpage. Both TeX or MS Word (recommended) files are possible.
To submit a paper to GTM2016 you need to register as a user to the EasyChar System.
The decision concerning the acceptance of a presentation will be made on the basis of the extended abstract submission. A volume of GTM 2016 extended abstracts will be available for registered participants at the beginning of the conference.
After the conference, all participants will have an opportunity to submit their papers for publication in a refereed "Contributions to Game Theory and Management", vol. X.
Deadlines
List of accepted papers
# |
Authors |
Title |
1 |
Andrey Zyatchin |
Open vehicle routing game |
2 |
Saeed Seyed Agha Banihashemi |
Co-existence of game theory and management |
3 |
Guennady Ougolnitsky and Anatoly Usov |
Comparative analysis of efficiency of the methods of sustainable management in hierarchical differential games |
4 |
Hongwei Gao, Han Qiao, Shou-Yang Wang and Meng-Ke Zhen |
The algorithm and model of pairwise stable networks |
5 |
Valery Vasilev |
On some fuzzy extensions of TU cooperative game |
6 |
Jian-Jun Shu |
Wisdom in Tian Ji’s Horse Racing Strategy |
7 |
Roberto Serrano, Geoffroy De Clippel and Rene Saran |
Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reason and Small Modeling Mistakes |
8 |
Wenna Wang, Hao Sun and Genjiu Xu |
Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the α-egalitarian Shapley value |
9 |
Jun Su, Genjiu Xu and Cuiying Zhu |
Bankruptcy approach to the cost allocation problems |
10 |
Ryusuke Hohzaki |
A Search Game with Incomplete Information on Detective Capability of Searcher |
11 |
Victor Rozen |
Situations of tr-equilibrium in antagonistic games with ordered outcomes |
12 |
Ibrahim Inal |
Purification without Common Knowledge of Priors |
13 |
Maryam Esmaeili |
A signaling advertising model between an intelligent consumer and two e-tailers |
14 |
Alexander Tarasyev |
Decomposition Algorithms for Construction of Control Strategies in Dynamical Games |
15 |
Michele Dell'Era |
Talking to Influence |
16 |
Vladimir Ushakov, Alexander Matviychuk and Andrey Ushakov |
Solution of Control Problems of Nonlinear Systems on a Finite Time Interval |
17 |
Alexander Nesterov |
School Choice With Advice: The Adaptive Acceptance Rule |
18 |
Jaeok Park |
Repeated Games with Recursive Utility |
19 |
Yunus Topbas and Unal Zenginobuz |
Horizontal Coordination and Transparency of Information |
20 |
Marina Sandomirskaia |
Nash-2 equilibrium: definition, interpretation, applications |
21 |
Jorge Gonzalez, David Ríos Insua and Javier Cano |
Adversarial Risk Analysis for Bi-agent Influence Diagrams |
22 |
Pavel Konyukhonskiy and Victoria Holodkova |
Game theory methods in the analysis of economic and political interaction at the international level |
23 |
Igor Bykadorov, Andrea Ellero, Stefania Funari, Sergey Kokovin and Pavel Molchanov |
Painful Birth of Trade under Classical Krugman’s Monopolistic Competition |
24 |
Natalia Aizenberg and Elena Stashkevich |
Effective pricing scheme on the retail electricity market for the different types of consumers |
25 |
Gustavo Bergantiños, Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga |
Consistency in PERT problems |
26 |
Jose Fernandez, Said Salhi and Boglárka G.-Tóth |
A location-price game for locating a competitive facility in the plane |
27 |
Anna Panova and Petr Panov |
On the costly voting model |
28 |
Alexander Tarasyev and Nikolay Krasovskii |
Dynamical Equilibria in Bimatrix Coordination Games |
29 |
Dmitrii Lozovanu and Stefan Pickl |
An Approach for Determining the Optimal Strategies in Average Antagonistic Stochastic Games |
30 |
Pierre Von Mouche |
On the New Approach of Coalition Formation |
31 |
Aleksei Kondratev |
Tournament as a cooperative game |
32 |
Ekaterina Gromova and Anna Tur |
On a Differential Game of Pollution Control with Random Terminal Instants |
33 |
Igor Asanov |
Do We Learn From Mistakes of Others? A Test of Observational Learning in the Bandit Problem |
34 |
Martha Saboya Baquero and Susana López González |
An alternative allocation rule for players in a communication network |
35 |
Maria Nastych |
Strong Nash equilibrium in oligopoly market with horizontal integration |
36 |
Stewart John Blakeway, Ekaterina Gromova, Dmitry Gromov, Anna Kirpichnikova and Nikolay Timonin |
A dynamic game on a mobile ad-hoc network |
37 |
Elena Lezhnina |
Approach for comparing the values of cooperative games |
38 |
Joosung Lee |
Spontaneous Referrals and Explicit Rewards |
39 |
Jing Fu |
Information pooling game in an interactive multi-portfolio optimization framework |
40 |
Dmitrii Serkov |
On joint fixed points in chain-complete posets |
41 |
Anastasiia Reusova |
Strategic Alliance Stability Factors |
42 |
Semyon Mestnikov and Nikolay Petrov |
The Sufficient Conditions k*-detection in the Simple Search Game on the Plane |
43 |
Aleksey Ogulenko and Olga Kichmarenko |
Dynamical games on time scales |
44 |
Alexey Soloviev |
Minimax estimation of Value-at-Risk under hedging of American contingent claims on a discrete financial market |
45 |
Yulia Ibragimova and Fedor Sandomirskiy |
Competitive Market Mechanisms for Fair Division of Indivisible Goods |
46 |
Clara Ponsati and Jan Zapal |
Electing the Pope: appointments by repeated ballots |
47 |
Anna Khmelnitskaya, Gerard van der Laan and Dolf Talman |
Generalization of binomial coefficients to numbers on the nodes of graphs |
48 |
Gerardo Berbeglia, Peter Sloan and Adrian Vetta |
The effect of a finite time horizon in the durable good monopoly problem |
49 |
Pascual Fernández, Blas Pelegrín and María Dolores García |
A first study on Discrete Competitive Facility Location with capacities under delivered pricing |
50 |
Boris Yanauer, Ekaterina Syrunina and Nikolay Zenkevich |
CEO Incentive Plans Improvement in the U.S. Public Companies on the Base of Game Theoretical Modeling |
51 |
N. Chrysanthopoulos and G. P. Papavassilopoulos |
A step closer to competition: A different concept of Cournot duopoly under incomplete information |
52 |
Aleksandr Chentsov and Dmitrii Serkov |
The elements of the operator convexity in the construction of the programmed iteration method |
53 |
Mark Koryagin, Eugene Duginov and Alexandra Dekina |
Optimization of an urban transport system on the condition of different goals of city’s districts |
54 |
Anatolii Kleimenov |
Aggressive behavior in non-antagonistic positional differential two-person games |
55 |
Elena Gubar, Ekaterina Zhitkova and Suriya Kumacheva |
Optimal behavior in the evolutionary model of spreading information about tax audits |
56 |
Elena Yanovskaya |
A characterization of the Nash Maximum Product (NMP) solution for Faired Division problems |
57 |
Yurii Averboukh |
Value multifunction for deterministic mean field game |
58 |
Nikolay Zenkevich and Anastasiia Pleshkova |
Knowledge-sharing reward efficiency: game theory-based case study |
59 |
Denis Kuzyutin, Maria Nikitina and Irina Marchenko |
Time-consistent cooperative solutions in multistage games with vector payoffs |
60 |
Anastasiia Ivakina and Ekaterina Zenkevich |
Supply chain cooperation modeling: trends and gaps |
61 |
Svetlana Tarashnina and Nadezhda V. Smirnova |
Some excess-based solutions in the game "The landowner and his serfs" |
62 |
Yaroslavna B. Pankratova and Svetlana Tarashnina |
On a dynamic traveling salesman problem |
63 |
Denisv. Kuzyutin, Maria V. Nikitina and Andrey Sinkevich |
On the vertical differentiation model in the insurance market |
64 |
Nikolay Bazenkov and Vsevolod Korepanov |
Farsighted network formation with locally-informed players |
65 |
Ovanes Petrosian |
Random Informational Horizon in Looking Forward Approach for Cooperative Differential Games |
66 |
Vladimir Matveenko, Alexei Korolev and Anastasia Alfimova |
On dynamic stability of equilibrium in network game with production and externalities |
67 |
Misha Gavrilovich and Victoria Kreps |
From a game with incomplete information to a game with complete information |
68 |
Alisa Maricheva and Fedor Sandomirskiy |
On envy-free allocations in large fair division problems with indivisible goods. |
69 |
Maksim Shlegel |
Coopetition game with a coordinator |
70 |
Elena Inarra |
Parametric rules and stable coalition structures |
71 |
Max van Dijk |
Cross-Border Collaboration in European-Russian Supply Chains: Integrative Approach of Provision on Design, Performance and Impediments |
72 |
Konstantinos Eleftheriou and Nickolas Michelacakis |
Social optimality of locations of heterogeneous firms in a unified model of spatial price discrimination. |
73 |
Natalia Naumova |
Reactive and semi--reactive bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation |
74 |
Anna Melnik |
The Comparison of two Transportation Games |
75 |
Gabriel Turbay |
Auction Equilibrium in Coalition Formation |
76 |
Ekaterina Zaytseva and Margarita Gladkova |
Cooperation and coordination in movie value chain |
77 |
Vladimir Mazalov |
Game-theoretic centrality measures for analysis of academic web space |
78 |
Anastasiia Koroleva |
Stability assessment of Volkswagen's Chinese joint ventures |
79 |
Igor Shevchenko and Dusan M. Stipanovic |
Smooth approximations for minimum and maximum functions and their use in the strategy design |
80 |
Irit Nowik and Tahl Nowik |
Blotto Games with Costly Winnings |
81 |
Julia Chirkova |
Optimal Arrivals to a Two-server Loss System with Random Access |
82 |
Natalia Nikitina |
The Price of Anarchy in a Game for Drug Discovery |
83 |
Vasilij Gusev |
The vectors of Shapley, Owen, and Aumann-Dreze in the Game Patrolling with Coalitional Structure |
84 |
Stefanos Leonardos and Costis Melolidakis |
Cournot competition with an external supplier under capacity constraints and demand uncertainty |
85 |
Anna N. Rettieva |
Discrete-time Dynamic Potential Games |
86 |
Pavel Chebotarev, Vitaly Malyshev, Yana Tsodikova, Anton Loginov, Zoya Lezina and Vadim Afonkin |
On the Optimal Voting Quota in a Stochastic Environment |
87 |
Elena Parilina and Artem Sedakov |
Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player |
88 |
Yulia Lonyagina and Nikolay Zenkevich |
Nash Equilibrium and Bargaining Solution in Multi-Echelon Distributive Supply Chains with Linear Demand |
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