5 June 2021
Main
When: June 5, 2021 г., 13.00
Duration: 1 hour
Where: online, MS Teams
Recommended for: doctoral students and academic staff
Working language: English
Participation: registration required.
About
The research seminar on the topic “Multiple directorships and financial performance of Russian public companies” is devoted to the problem of studying one of the most important elements of the intellectual capital of the board of directors - social capital, from the perspective of its relationship with the financial performance of companies. The social capital of board members is a valuable company asset. With the experience, relations, and other resources directors bring to the company, social capital becomes an important determinant of performance and a driver of value creation.
The proxy of the social capital is such an indicator as the multiple directorships, that is, the number of external appointments held by directors in other companies. It should be noted that the multiple directors positions is not only a measure of the directors' social capital, but also one of the characteristics of the quality of the corporate governance system in the company.
The phenomenon of multiple directorships is investigated in the project from the point of view of how this indicator is related to the company's performance, based on the role and functions that the board of directors performs. Therefore, the research question of how multiple directors positions affect directors' monitoring, advising and resource providing role, and are related to company performance, is relevant and important. Research on this topic demonstrates two opposite positions as to whether multiple directorships is a factor in the creation of company value or it can have a negative impact on the performance of the firm. One of the positions, based on the reputation hypothesis, considers this phenomenon as a factor that positively affects the performance and value of the company. Another, which is based on the “busyness” hypothesis, on the contrary, argues that as a result of external directorships, directors become “busy,” which means they are not inclined or unable to perform their functions on the board efficiently. At the seminar we present our view on this issue and the results of a pilot study on the multiple directors positions.
Speakers
Irina V. Berezinets
Candidate of Physic and Mathematic Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Finance and Accounting, GSOM SPbU, independent member of the supervisory board of PJSC “Bank Uralsib”, senior independent director
Dmitry A. Grigoriev
Candidate of Physic and Mathematic Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Informatics, Mathematics and Mechanics Faculty, SPbU
Yulia B. Ilina
Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Finance and Accounting, GSOM SPbU
Questions?
Yulia A. Semenova
GSOM SPbU Research Support Department
Tel.: +7 (812) 323 84 53
E-mail: y.a.semenova@gsom.spbu.ru
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